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ABSTRACT
The ubiquity of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, combined with
pervasive smartphones and desktop and laptop computers
featuring virtual personal assistants from Siri to Google and Alexa
to Cortana, has made both ethical and unethical hacking easier
and at the same time more complex. Google Home, Amazon
Echo, smart appliances, video surveillance cameras, and even
regular desktop and laptop computers have quietly changed both
the home and workplace to always-on, always-listening
environments. In this paper, we examine both social and
ethical/legal perspectives on scenarios such as whether it should
be considered free speech, a harmless prank, or unethical behavior
to say “Okay, Google, how can I remove DNA evidence from my
car upholstery” within hearing distance of a friend’s phone. Or, as
one case states it: Can you yell “Hey, Siri” in a crowded theater?

Categories and Subject Descriptors
• Security and privacy ~ Social aspects of security and privacy

General Terms
Management, Design, Security, Human Factors, Legal Aspects.

Keywords
Keywords are your own designated keywords.

1. INTRODUCTION
The rapid proliferation of always-on and always-listening Internet
of Things (IoT) devices has given rise to new ethical and legal
concerns regarding data stored or processed by these tools. The
recent 2016 murder investigation [1] in which police in
Bentonville, Arkansas subpoenaed Amazon for all "audio
recordings, transcribed records, text records and other data"
collected from a suspect's Amazon Echo smart home speaker
highlights one especially interesting case. But, precedent goes
back to at least 2012, when IBM famously banned the use of
Apple's Siri virtual assistant by employees while at work [2].
Earlier this year, Amazon's Alexa made news again [3] when a 6year-old accidentally placed an order for a $170 dollhouse on her
parents' account when the little girl innocently asked, "Alexa, can
you play dollhouse with me and get me a dollhouse?" The effect
was multiplied when the incident was reported on the local news,
allegedly causing several additional Amazon Echo devices to
respond to the newscaster’s amused restatement of the little girl’s
request [4]. Then, in April, Burger King raised privacy concerns
by running ads intentionally designed to activate Google Home
devices by asking “Okay Google, what is the Whopper Burger?”,
triggering the reading of a Wikipedia article on the hamburger.

Homes and workplaces alike have introduced myriad new "smart"
devices over the past several years, often without sufficient
consideration of security and privacy concerns of introducing
such gadgets [5]. Homeowners may install inexpensive front
doorbell cameras, Amazon Echo or Google Home voice-enabled
speakers, smart thermostats, Wi-Fi bathroom scales, automated
door locks, smart electronic appliances, digital video recorders
and app-enabled TVs without examining the types of data these
appliances and accessories may collect, as well as where, or for
how long, that data is stored. While a $25 entryway webcam or a
$100 smart speaker may seem like a minor purchase, if it shares a
home network with a family's smartphones, tablets, laptops,
printers, video game consoles, and a desktop computer with all
the family’s financial records, then all a hacker might need to look
up online is the default username and password for the $25
webcam to have access to an entire home network. Add a few
free, easy-to-use, open-source tools like Kali Linux and
Metasploit and even a minimally skilled hacker could suddenly
make a family’s private, personal information very public. If such
a webcam or smart speaker temporarily or permanently stores data
from your home in the cloud, it could further expose the user and
their family to additional hacking, blackmail, or invasive searches
that could easily be misunderstood, misused, or intentionally
abused.
Among the ethical and legal consequences of ubiquitous, alwayson IoT devices, this paper examines the following scenarios:
“voice hacking”, a new social engineering technique in which an
unauthorized party extracts information just by summoning a
virtual assistant; a smart speaker used as evidence in a child
custody case; a Bluetooth front-door lock's historical data
subpoenaed in an insurance investigation; a homeowner facing
civil and possible criminal penalties due to a hacked IoT device in
her home that was used by an outside criminal organization to
break into government computers; a ransomware attack locking
up your new, always-connected automobile and demanding
payment in almost-untraceable bitcoins to make it drivable again;
and millions of poorly-protected IoT devices from a small number
of manufacturers becoming compromised and perpetrating a
massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack that cripples
Internet service on two continents.
Proposed best practices for manufacturing, installing and using
IoT devices are discussed, and recommendations for weighing the
utility of such devices against the ethical and legal ramifications
of omnipresent sensors and Internet-connectivity in both the home
and workplace, as well as on the road, are provided.

2. BACKGROUND
IoT security has regularly made national headlines lately as
discussed in the previous section, but recently there has been a

special emphasis on the insecurity of always-on, always-listening
devices. Siri, Alexa, and Google Home have received significant
attention as sources of privacy concern in the media [6], but two
recent events that made world news are causing many consumers
to reevaluate the security considerations around regular old PC
microphones and newer “smart” appliances alike.
An industrial IoT security firm, CyberX, discovered a large-scale
cyber espionage attack against over 70 Ukrainian firms in which
PC microphones were used to eavesdrop, record conversations,
and send data to servers and DropBox accounts controlled by the
hackers [7]. The attack reportedly involved hundreds of gigabytes
of data, and appeared to be “backed by an organization with
substantial resources”, such as a state-sponsored unit [7]. The
researchers noted that, unlike video recordings, which can be
blocked by the user placing tape over the camera lens, it is
practically impossible for users to completely disable the
microphone in a laptop computer, for example, without physically
disconnecting the hardware inside the computer.
More recently, WikiLeaks released documents alleging CIA
surveillance use of smart TVs, phones, and cars to record
conversations, send data to CIA servers [8]. One of the more
disturbing revelations was the existence of a hack known as “fake
off” that would cause targeted smart TVs, including those from
Samsung, a top manufacturer, to appear to turn off, but actually
remain on and record conversations through the device’s
microphone. A smart TV microphone legitimately allows users to
make voice commands as a convenience feature, but the
convenience comes at a potentially steep cost in privacy.
These are only two scenarios of seemingly innocuous listening
devices being used to snoop on unsuspecting users, but they
expose a range of security, ethical, privacy, and legal concerns
across both traditional PCs and newer smart devices, appliances,
and even smart cars, all of which regularly come with voice
interaction these days. The question may not be, “is someone
listening to us?”, but “can someone listen to us?”, whether at
home, at work, or on the road. And the answer seems to be,
increasingly, yes.

3. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.1 “Voice Hacking”
One relatively new area of research is in the domain we have
dubbed “voice hacking” — using voice commands to access a
device without authorization. A simple example is asking a
friend’s phone, “Hey, Siri, what was my last incoming call?” or
“Okay, Google, read my last text message.” Those may seem
harmless enough, unless a snooping boss or coworker finds out
you had a phone interview with a competitor, or a spouse finds a
questionable text message from a third party. However, it is easy
to envision more nefarious voice queries. Is it free speech, a
harmless prank, or unethical behavior to say “Okay, Google, how
can I remove DNA evidence from my car upholstery” to another
person’s phone? Or, perhaps worse for some, “Hey, Siri, who is
the best divorce attorney in town?” To put a finer point on it, can
you yell “Hey, Siri” in a crowded theater?
Both cybersecurity researchers and the media have been warning
consumers for years that Siri allows anyone to bypass many
iPhone lock screen features [9], and Google listens for the key
phrase “Okay Google” in anyone’s voice, not just that of the
device’s owner. Even synthesized, pre-recorded, and broadcast

voice commands have been demonstrated to activate smartphones
and smart home devices [10], as was the case when the news
anchor’s report on the 6-year-old’s accidental doll house order
activated other Alexa devices to place the same order [4].
Consider how this could be used maliciously, though. An author
could post a YouTube video or a multimedia Facebook ad with
the phrase “Alexa, order me five copies of Teach Your Kids to
Code” (or any title they’ve authored), followed by a short pause,
then the word “Yes!” to confirm the order. Unfortunately for most
Amazon Echo users, Amazon does not require a password or PIN
code for purchases by default, meaning that the majority of new
Echo and Dot users would be susceptible to such an attack [11].

3.2 Covert Voice Hacking
If the previous scenarios didn’t cause sufficient apprehension
regarding smart device security, Carlini et al. [12] were able to
“hide” voice commands in audio that was distorted sufficiently to
make it difficult for the human ear to recognize, but still
recognizable to Google’s voice assistant. The researchers were
able to direct phones to successfully open a web site registered by
the team, noting that malware could easily have been hosted at the
address. Such distorted voice commands could be overlaid onto a
YouTube video or other seemingly harmless audio/video sample,
or even a multimedia advertisement, and quickly disseminated to
thousands of users or more.
Using this technology, a malicious hacker could conceivably call
in to a popular broadcast talk radio program, play a short burst of
audio with an embedded voice command that would sound like
static or speaker feedback to the human ear, but that could be
interpreted in thousands of vehicles during rush hour to activate
GPS, satellite services like OnStar, or a hands-free Bluetooth
phone assistant. While the caller covers by apologizing for
dropping his phone, the voice command could already have
impacted unsuspecting drivers, to potentially significant
consequences.
Researchers have recommended fixes, from deactivating voice
services to developing multimodal biometric authentication
systems to require both fingerprint and voice verification, for
example [13]. However, researchers at the University of Alabama
at Birmingham warn that a few minutes of recordings of a
person’s voice (from a compromised listening device, for
example) can be used with off-the-shelf voice morphing software
to successfully impersonate that person’s voice at a level
sufficient to fool most biometric security and even trick human
listeners [14]. And, it should be noted that even devices that listen
for patterns in one user’s voice in particular can often be foiled
with a simple recording of that person’s voice, allowing for voice
“replay attacks” even in devices that feature an added layer of
biometric security.

3.3 Insecure by (Manufacturer’s) Design
Unfortunately, the pattern seems to be that the majority of
manufacturers are racing to bring interactive voice convenience
technologies to the marketplace, with security added on as an
afterthought, if it is considered at all. Apple labeled Siri’s ability
to be used from the lock screen as a “feature”, but Apple devices
allow the user to revoke Siri’s access from a settings menu as an
option. Security is not the default setting.

Amazon follows a similar tack for Echo and Dot users, noting
that, “After you register your Alexa device, voice purchasing is on
by default” [11], and figuratively burying the option to require a
4-digit confirmation code several clicks deep in the Amazon
Device Support web site.
The same seems to hold true across several classes of IoT devices
[5], with security deficiencies found in smart TVs, thermostats,
doorbell webcams, and more. While efforts toward standardizing
best practices for manufacturers exist, like the IoT Project at
OWASP [15], there are few if any regulations requiring
manufacturers of these new devices to meet such standards, and
little to no legal precedent for holding device manufacturers
accountable for the lax default security configurations or for
potential damage resulting from misuse of insecure devices.

4. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF IoT
In the landmark murder case of State of Arkansas v. Bates, the
defendant James Bates owned an Amazon Echo device, also
known by Amazon’s voice service name, “Alexa” [16]. An
acquaintance of the defendant was found dead in the defendant’s
hot tub, and the prosecuting attorney sought to find out whether
the voice recordings or transcription from the Amazon device
found in the nearby room might contain useful information about
the circumstances of the death in question.
Law enforcement issued a search warrant to Amazon to produce
any audio or transcripts from the Echo device owned by Bates.
[16]. Amazon argued in its motion to quash the search warrant
that the First Amendment applies to this case in two ways. First,
when someone requests information from the Echo device, this is
protected speech under the First Amendment. Amazon argued
that this First Amendment right protects the “right to receive
information and ideas” [16]. “For this reason, courts have
recognized that government demands for records of an
individual’s requests for and purchases of expressive material
implicate First Amendment concerns” [16].
Secondly, Amazon maintained that the Echo’s responses to user
queries are also protected by the First Amendment [16]. Amazon
compared these queries to other types of speech found by some
courts to be protected, such as internet search engine inquiries and
the ranking of search results. Therefore, the user queries
themselves, as well as the Echo responses should be protected.
Amazon’s stated intent was not to “obstruct any lawful
investigation, but rather ... to protect the privacy rights of its
customers when the government is seeking their data from
Amazon, especially when that data may include expressive
content protected by the First Amendment” [16].
There are many other issues in which Amazon’s precedent may
enter the courts. One example could be child custody cases.
Imagine a child custody case in which one or both parents are
claiming the other parent is unfit. As evidence, the parent wants
to use search inquiries sought by the other parent using the
Amazon Echo, Google Home, or similar service. What if either
parent yelled often, either in a threatening manner, or simply
because they lived in a two-story house and they often shouted to
one another upstairs? What if one or both parents engaged in child
abuse and this fact was captured by an Amazon or Google device?
The court must take into consideration the best interest of the
child in deciding custody issues. Should holders of data be
required to turn over the information in such cases? The issues

involving the First Amendment versus the best interest of the
child are interesting and are ripe for further research.
Further, consider a situation in which a homeowner has installed a
remote front door lock that can lock or unlock the door via a
smartphone. Imagine that this home gets burglarized and many
items are stolen. The homeowner swears that the house was
locked, but there is no sign of a forced entry. What are the legal
ramifications if the homeowner’s insurance policy subpoenas the
records involving the remote locking/unlocking of the doors by
the owner? As the insurance company, should you include in the
license agreement a waiver by the homeowner to object to an
insurance subpoena? What are the legal ramifications of such a
waiver? Beyond that, what if the burglar was adept enough to
erase or change log entries on the Bluetooth door lock? Would the
lock manufacturer bear any responsibility if the device were
unencrypted or under-protected from hacking, as a majority of
devices in one recent study were [17]?
Finally, envision a situation in which a homeowner has several
IoT devices in her home. This homeowner does not change the
default username and password given when setting up the devices.
An outside criminal enterprise gains easy access to the devices in
this home by finding the device listed in the IoT search engine
Shodan.io, and then finds the default username and password for
the device from a user’s manual posted online. Instead of spying
on this home, the criminals use this home’s devices as a conduit
to break into certain government agency records or possibly to set
up a denial-of-service attack against a governmental entity (or any
business enterprise). What is the civil or criminal liability of the
homeowner in this situation? The homeowner can claim
ignorance, and was not directly involved in any of the wrongful
activity. However, the negligent act of not changing the default
password was integral to everything that subsequently occurred.
Once again, does the manufacturer bear any responsibility for not
requiring the user to change the default username and password
upon installation?

5. SOCIETAL AND GLOBAL IMPACT
5.1 Ransomware
One significant worldwide impact in the past several years has
come in the form of ransomware, malicious software designed to
hold computers’ data “hostage” until a sum of money is paid,
usually in difficult-to-trace bitcoins or other virtual currency. A
recent high-profile case involved a Hollywood hospital in which
attackers locked hospital staff out of the majority of the hospitals
network for almost a week by encrypting the data with a secret
code that only the attackers possessed [18]. The hospital’s
administrators paid over $17,000 in bitcoins to regain access to
their systems, after having to transfer patients to other facilities to
provide care for them in the interim.
Hospitals and businesses aren’t the only potential victims, though.
Researchers from a security consulting firm recently demonstrated
a proof of concept to hijack an Internet-connected thermostat like
the ones used in private homes and newer smart buildings [19].
The testers demonstrated a ransomware attack that could turn the
heat up to 99 degrees and require the user to pay to receive a PIN
code to regain access to the thermostat’s controls. They also noted
that the same type of attack could turn on both the heat and air
conditioning at the same time, costing the homeowner or business
exorbitant utility bills until the ransom was paid.

In some cases, it might not even be necessary to code an actual
attack, but simply pop up a message stating that the device is
locked and requires payment to restore access. Fake ransomware
popups have been used on the Internet for years, and it would be
conceivable that similar ploys on IoT devices could prove
profitable due to naïve users calling a toll-free number or paying
the ransom online, further exposing the user to additional
extortion or further social engineering attacks.
As a hypothetical case, imagine a ransomware attack locking up
your new, always-connected automobile and demanding payment
in almost-untraceable bitcoins to make it drivable again. And,
what if the ransomware engages while you are driving, causing
your automobile to lock up on the road, and you strike a
pedestrian? What if widespread ransomware were to shut down
cars across a city during rush hour, or across an entire continent?

5.2 IoT Strikes Back: The 2016 Mirai Botnet
In another real-world attack, IoT devices, including digital video
recorders (DVRs) and webcams were used to disrupt Internet
access on two continents in October 2016 [20]. Using a list of
default usernames and passwords, the hackers behind the Mirai
botnet were able to compromise over 100,000 IoT devices by
scanning the Internet looking for IP addresses pointing at certain
types of hardware. Devices responding to the scan were accessed
by using the manufacturer’s default credentials, usually because
the consumer had not changed the passwords, but in some cases,
the manufacturer’s username and password might not have been
able to be removed, even after users created their own [20].
For most of the day on Friday, October 21, 2016, these DVRs,
webcams, and other Internet-connected devices interfered with a
core component of the Internet’s infrastructure, the domain name
system, disrupting such sites as Twitter, Netflix, CNN and others
across Europe and North America [21]. The attack was rated as
the largest of its kind in history, with an “extraordinary attack
strength” of 1.2 Terabits per second (Tbps).
The botnet has since emerged in the Dark Web as a distributed
denial of service (DDoS) for hire, purporting to give buyers
access to the massive disruptive power of hundreds of thousands
of hacked devices to bring down any target, for a price. Such
nefarious tools are within reach of both criminal enterprises and
rogue nation-states, as well as well-funded terrorist organizations,
necessitating a change in the way we design and deploy IoT
devices.

5.3 Ethical, Legal and Social Impact of IoT
Imagine a scenario where a group of foreign government
delegates are negotiating a matter that could impact the state of
foreign relations between countries. During recess when the
delegation meets to consult with their home offices, all the
sensitive discussions are being monitored by the opposing side
through an IoT device that has been hacked. The situation
becomes even more precarious when a rogue third-party hacker
breaches those devices with the purpose of destabilizing the
country. In this case, the rogue actor is using space of a different
kind, namely cyber, compared to tradition when territorial space
was the only space being used for the destabilizing act [23].
A number of practical steps should be considered to mitigate these
risks. However, such measures require a new regulatory
framework within which governments can operate. There are
internal constraints as imposed by domestic law, as well as
external constraints within international politics. In the same

manner that the world has the United Nations and its myriad of
international organizations to help prevent another great war, so it
is argued that a new cyberwar regulatory regime should be
established. The UN Charter references “armed attack” (UN
Charter Art. 51) but makes no mention of a “cyber-attack.”
Provision will have to be made in domestic and international law
for this new type of warfare [24].

6. RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Manufacturers
While innovation is crucial to the world economy, manufacturers
have a role to play in protecting users and the critical
infrastructure of the Internet itself from the devices they create
and sell. Efforts like the OWASP IoT Security Project [15] can
significantly curtail exploitation of IoT devices for malicious use
by addressing the most common vulnerabilities in the design and
deployment of household, business, and automobile IoT devices.
Additionally, in the case of listening devices, manufacturers may
need to provide physical access to microphone hardware in order
to give customers the option of disabling listening functionality
when desired, or provide hard-wired indicators, such as LEDs, to
signal to users that voice or other data is being processed,
recorded, or transmitted. Further regulations, civil or criminal
penalties may be necessary to address manufacturers or vendors
that continue to sell insecure devices.

6.2 ISPs and Major Carriers
A common thread in all Internet-connected devices is the Internet
connection itself. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and major
telecommunications carriers have more direct and immediate
access to Internet traffic and its contents in real-time. The ability
to detect and block rogue traffic, compromised devices, and
known malicious IP addresses both at the source and along the
route, or at least to “flag” potential offenders, could supplement
consumer and organizational defensive layers like firewalls and
intrusion detection systems. By either actively preventing attacks,
or at the very least by sharing information with edge devices about
possible detected attacks as they’re occurring, communications
providers could bridge an important gap in security as it currently
stands.

6.3 Consumers
Finally, we, as consumers of IoT devices, bear significant
responsibility in our use of these devices in our homes,
businesses, and automobiles. First, being aware of the devices that
may be listening around us, or that may be sending other data to
the Internet, and disabling features that we’re not using would
remove a significant exposure to attack. Second, buying only
devices that conform to security best practices like those noted by
OWASP [15] would reduce the attack surface even more. Finally,
taking care to deploy IoT devices in a secure manner, including
changing or disabling default usernames and passwords, turning
off unused services, turning on encryption and passcodes,
patching or updating devices regularly, and disabling devices
when not in use will protect both the user, and the world.

7. CONCLUSION
In our IoT Security Lab, the authors have verified the most of the
above-mentioned “voice hacking” and other scenarios, across a
range of devices, from Google Home to Amazon Alexa devices,

on Android, iPhone, and Windows phones, as well as on standard
desktop and laptop PCs. What we found was at times amusing,
other times alarming, but always eye-opening. Our conclusion is
that there is much work to be done to secure the Internet of
Things, and particularly what we have coined the Internet of
Listening Things (IoLT).
At its worst, the ubiquity of IoT devices, and their vulnerability to
cyber hacking, is a direct threat to governments’ national security
interests. We should accept the fact that non-state and state actors
will want as much access to sensitive national security
information as possible in order to strengthen their negotiating
positions. Whether it be ransom money for information in the
form of bit coins in the case of non-state actors, or negotiating
from a position of strength based on sensitive information in the
case of state actors, states are at risk of having their most sensitive
national security information breached by hackers through IoT
devices. The problem is that such breaches may have been
happening for a while without the knowledge of the at-risk actor.
We just don’t know. We therefore have to behave as though these
breaches occur daily, if not moment-by-moment, and have to
strategize to minimize the cyber risks to our national security
interests and its effect on foreign policy formulation.
Regulations will not prevent cyber-attacks, but will certainly be
able to impose sanctions and penalties against the offender in the
case of a state actor. In the case of non-state actors, harsh
penalties for cyber-hacking will have to serve as a deterrent from
such rogue behavior. Cyber-attacks are here to stay and the
pervasive and ubiquitous use of IoT devices has made our world
more complex and challenging to navigate. That which was
intended to make life simpler can be used as the portal for rogue
actors to sow fear, confusion, and, potentially, destruction. But
all hope is not lost. A concerted effort among IoT device
manufacturers, communications providers, and consumers can
turn the tide on IoT hacking, if we act, together, before it is too
late.
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